pico-quorum

A Trust M signer for a mainnet Safe

PicoQuorum’s OPTIGA Trust M signer is one owner of a 3-of-5 Safe on Ethereum. These pages are the shareable part. The chip profile and its ceremony are in ../TRUSTM.md.

Page	For
COSIGNERS.md	the other owners: check the signer, day to day, execution, a lost device
THREAT-MODEL.md	everyone, once: what you can rely on, and what you can’t
CONFIGURATION.md	the recommended setup, and the address lock-down options still to decide
RUNBOOK.md	the operator: a chip from the bag to an owner, and what to do when things go wrong
attest/	each chip’s ceremony record, checked with tools/quorum verify

Where it stands (2026-10-01)

TM1, the first Trust M (serial 0a091b5c000b0062006c, owner 0x47c0998C6a7A1955794071b9f4058e7814178f35):

• Sealed. The key, record and binding were frozen on 2026-09-29.
• The other 23 objects, and Infineon’s three, are still at factory state. T9 will freeze all 26; it has now run on a sacrificial chip (TM2). TM2 also showed why Infineon’s three belong in T9: below operational their rules can be rewritten (see ../TRUSTM.md, “TM2”).
• Its record predates the live check: run tools/fw attest on TM1 again.
• Base Sepolia: an owner of the rehearsal 3-of-5 Safe 0x5617…DC41. Its signer is deployed there, and its first approval executed onchain on 2026-09-30.
• Base and Ethereum: getSigner agrees on both chains. The signer is not deployed on either.
• Its record attest/attest-0a091b5c000b0062006c.json passes tools/quorum verify --chain basesep,base,eth.

The mainnet chip will be a fresh one (TM3). The steps before it:

• TM2, sacrificial (2026-10-01): T1–T10 on the device, T9 froze all 23 spares (only the lifecycle byte changed), and every write, new key and metadata change on a sealed or frozen object was refused (../TRUSTM.md, “TM2”).
• TM1: T9 on the device (tools/fw ceremony start --unpin), with an explicit yes.
• Decide whether T9 freezes the spare key slots E0F2/E0F3 (CONFIGURATION.md).
• TM3: the full ceremony on the device, tools/fw attest, and every co-signer runs verify.
• Gas, after an explicit yes: live enroll --chain eth, and the mainnet Safe.

The ceremony’s last steps on the screen

Drawn by the real firmware on the emulator’s virtual Trust M (node tools/board/shots_tm.mjs). The chip in the shots is one that was sealed before T9 existed, as TM1 is.

The ceremony image on a sealed chip. PROVISION goes to T8.	T8, the seal checked. The record, the binding, and a test signature. Changes nothing.
T9, freeze the spares. PERMANENT: the arm, then a 3 s hold. Only the lifecycle is written, to operational, never termination.	T9 done. Each group frozen, the key still signs, the security counter before and after.
With --keep-open (here F1D2), the screen says what stays open: for example the spare key slots, if a chip should hold a second key later.	T10. Its last line stays red until tools/fw ceremony finish turns ALLOW_* off.
The console’s Chip page before T9: what is still writable.	And after: nothing else on the chip can be written or get a key.